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Abstract: The classical portrait of legal fidelity emphasizes that interpreters should
sharply distinguish between their own judgments about morality or public policy, and
their judgments about what the law requires. An instrumental approach to legal reasoning
violates this basic obligation. This article argues that one of the constitutional heroes
most exalted by constitutional theorists, Frederick Douglass, explicitly advocated the
instrumental approach to interpretation that the classical concept of fidelity warns against.
The implication of this argument is either that Douglass is not a constitutional hero, or
that constitutional fidelity is not necessary for constitutional heroes. The argument that
constitutional heroism does not require citizens to be faithful to the documents’ text
requires a reworking of our basic categories of constitutional agency. I conclude by
offering a few thoughts on how such a reworking might be achieved if Douglass’ status
as a constitutional hero is to be maintained.

The classical portrait of legal fidelity emphasizes that interpreters should sharply
distinguish between their own judgments of political morality and public policy, and their
judgments about what the law requires. In constitutional theory, such textual fidelity is
mandated not only by the requirements of legalism (and by the Constitution’s
identification of itself as the supreme law of the land), but also by the requirements of
consent theory. Honoring the consenting moment of constitutional ratifiers, the argument
goes, requires interpreters to follow the text of the Constitution, not manipulate that text
in service of their own ends. Hence an instrumental approach to legal reasoning (where
the reasoning is dictated only by the results the interpreter wishes to arrive at) violates
basic obligations towards legal fidelity and the honoring of consent.

This article argues that Frederick Douglass’ mature constitutional position
advocated precisely that instrumental approach to the interpretation of the US
Constitution that the classical concept of legal fidelity warns against. The interpretation
of Douglass’ thought offered here runs counter to other scholarly treatments of his
interpretive position. And for good reason: under classical notions of fidelity, the
argument offered in this article should lead us to understand Douglass not as a
constitutional hero, but rather as a revolutionary or subversive reformer. But, although
scholars are wrong to equate Douglass’ position with any reasonable interpretive theory
of the Constitution, their desire to hold on to Douglass as a model of constitutional
citizenship is well-founded. Far from leading us to reject Douglass’ constitutional
heroism as heroism, Douglass’ example should lead us to revise our classical notions of
the relationship between legal fidelity and constitutional fidelity. The essay concludes
with thoughts on how such a revision might be accomplished.
Frederick Douglass’ mature constitutional position was essentially instrumental in
a way that is problematic under the classical conception of constitutional fidelity. I am
using the concept of “instrumental” to refer to any interpretive position that is disciplined
only by the results that the interpreter wishes to achieve, and hence which fails to be
disciplined by even the most generous reading of the Constitution’s text. This definition
purposely excludes a situation where the interpreter is motivated by strategic calculations,
but chooses an interpretive theory that is still reasonable in that it does not lead the
interpreter to actually ignore the public meaning of explicit constitutional guarantees or
mandates. Perhaps because of Douglass’ status as a constitutional hero, this dimension of
Douglass’ thought has been either ignored or seriously downplayed in Douglass
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scholarship, and its implications have been ignored in normative constitutional
theorizing. Let us turn now to Douglass’ constitutional position.

Douglass’ constitutional transformation
Frederick Douglass was an escaped slave whose rhetorical and intellectual
powers, as well as his fierce dedication to the cause, made him a leading abolitionist
within only a few years of his escape from slavery. Sanford Levinson offers him as a
model of textualist discipline, in contrast to legal theorists like Ronald Dworkin who
“invites anyone engaging in constitutional interpretation to reflect on the changing moral
structure of society, including its background unwritten “principles,” rather than to rely
on written text,” and tells us that he could bring himself to sign the constitution in part in
honor of Douglass’ own faith in the Constitution’s language (Levinson 1988, 31;
Levinson 2006, 4.) His first political alliance was to radical anti-Constitution abolitionists
who called the Constitution (in William Garrison’s words) an “agreement with Hell and
covenant with death.” Prominent within this group was Wendell Phillips, as well as
Garrison himself. These radical abolitionists forswore political coercion of any kind and
pressed for Northern secession from a corrupt (and corrupting) Union. Resisting the
appeals of political abolitionists like Lysander Spooner, William Goodell, Beriah Green,
and Gerrit Smith, radical abolitionists emphasized that their principles required them to
refuse complicity in the US government even to the extent of refusing to vote or hold
office. They instead focused on awakening the conscience of the people through protest
and persuasion. Douglass discovered the writings of these radical abolitionists while still
a slave, and quickly associated himself with their cause when he achieved freedom. But
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his own developing political judgment – as well as his developing friendships with
Spooner, Green, and Smith -- soon led Douglass to reject the ideal of non-complicity to
the extent of non-voting. In 1851 Douglass publicly announced the change in his
allegiance. He now identified himself as a political abolitionist and urged Americans to
use the political, as well as moral, powers available to them to resist slavery.i This
transformation of 1851 was a pivotal moment in abolitionist politics. The switch was
publicly momentous, and Douglass was charged with opportunism and roguery—charges
which echoed about him for many years after the fact.ii
Understanding Douglass’ mature constitutional position requires understanding
the details his 1851 transformation. Douglass himself insisted that the core of his position
had not changed. His firm commitment to abolitionism above all else was a hallmark of
his thinking, always—his “grand and commanding object.”iii What, then, made 1851 such
a momentous year?
The first change was to his belief about the kind of constitutional attitude that
would best support abolition. Douglass came to believe that Americans would not
support abolitionism if doing so meant rejecting the Constitution. He also believed that a
reform movement which eschewed the use of political tools like voting risked
catastrophic failure—a live option in 1851, given that this was the year when Congress
transmitted, by 2/3 approval in each house, a constitutional amendment to the states to
explicitly entrench slavery in the states against federal interference. Douglass hence came
to believe that the best option for abolitionists was to argue that the Constitution was antislavery, and that the political powers granted under the Constitution (including voting)
should be used to abolish slavery.
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The second change was the content of his position itself. Douglass went from
arguing that we could know the Constitution was pro-slavery because of the considerable
protections it offered to slaveholders, to an argument that portrayed the Constitution as
anti-slavery because it never used the word “slave.” We will examine this change at
length.
The third change was over a meta-theoretical question of fidelity itself. Douglass’
new position was not just motivated by pragmatic political judgments. The
instrumentality of his new position went beyond that. Douglass’ post-1851 position was
self-consciously aware of, and approving of, the instrumental use of constitutional
interpretation itself. Although many scholars acknowledge a strategic element of
Douglass’ transformation, his post-transformation position on constitutional meaning
incorporated into its content a role for strategic judgment that has been entirely neglected.
Douglass didn’t just switch interpretive positions for strategic reasons; the new position
he adopted was self-consciously aware of, and approving of, the strategic use of
constitutional interpretation itself.
In 1849, Douglass had emphasized the complicity of the Constitution in
supporting slavery. The fugitive slave clause, the power of the federal government to put
down insurrections, and the power of slaveholders to move their slave property
throughout the Union meant that the entire nation was complicit in the outrage of
slavery.iv He regarded the Constitution as a “foul curse,” and desired to see it “shivered
in a thousand fragments.”v He may have adopted this reading for strategic purposes; in a
few 1849 letters, Douglass described his expectation that the more strenuously
Southerners insisted on a pro-slavery reading of the Constitution, the sooner Northerners
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would be “awakened” to their complicity in slavery.vi But whatever Douglass’
expectations were, he did not describe his position itself in strategic terms.
The language he did use to describe his position should be familiar to those versed
in the classical demands of constitutional fidelity. Douglass was acutely sensitive to the
idea that legal obligations could depart from the demands of justice and morality.vii He
also indicated a respect for the requirements of faithful interpretation that he couched in
the language of morality, asking whether it was “good morality to . . . put a meaning
upon a legal instrument the very opposite of what we have good reason to believe was the
intention of the men who framed it?”viii In accordance with the classical position of the
faithful interpreter, the pre-transformation Douglass responded to the political
abolitionists that they could not “have a stronger wish to turn every rightful
instrumentality against slavery, than we [the radical abolitionists] have; and if the
Constitution can be so turned . . . we shall readily, gladly and zealously turn our feeble
energies in that direction. . .”ix (emphasis added). Notice Douglass’ concern that
abolitionists not make political use of instruments that were not ‘rightfully’ theirs. This
concern for the integrity of the constitutional text sits comfortably with the principled
approach of the classical faithful interpreter. But, Douglass continued, given the
Constitution’s support for the practice of slaveholding, to adopt the Constitution’s ends as
one’s own would be to “to become a guilty party to it, and in reply we say—No!” x
Although Douglass was rejecting the authority of the antebellum Constitution in
particular, he understood his insistence on respecting the Constitution’s meaning as a
general component of lawfulness. For example, Douglass resisted political abolitionist
Gerrit Smith’s suggestion that if the government “have a Constitution under which it
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cannot abolish slavery, then it must override the Constitution and abolish slavery.” This
doctrine he found “radically unsound,” for a government acting outside “the very charter
of the government” would be “nothing better than a lawless mob, acting without any
other or higher authority than its own convictions or impulses as to what is right or
wrong.”xi (find date and context) Douglass reflected his abiding concern with the
distinction between what was lawful and what was right in other domains as well, and
used that distinction to defend his actions in areas where they would seem to require no
defense. For example, when Douglass’ friends purchased his freedom, some abolitionists
criticized Douglass for paying his former owner to secure what was a natural liberty.
Abolitionist and pacifist Henry Wright objected that the natural right to self-ownership
made the transaction with Thomas Auld, Douglass’ former master, illegitimate. Instead of
simply refusing to engage the challenge to his behavior from men who could never know
or experience the risks of an escape from slavery, Douglass took the opportunity to insist
upon and develop the distinction between “legal freedom” and “abstract right and natural
freedom.”xii Prior to his transformation of 1851, this distinction was one that Douglass
cared about and spoke about regularly.
In resisting the Constitution’s complicity with slavery, the pre-transformation
Douglass evoked the familiar language of reluctance, where the interpreter, driven by the
demands of fidelity and reason, is (regretfully) required to arrive at conclusions that
reveal the text to be unjust and even immoral. (cite Cover ‘language of reluctance’)
Consider the strikingly resonant words with which he introduced one of his most
important pre-transformation addresses on slavery:
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Of one thing, however, we can assure our readers, and that is, that we
bring to the consideration of this subject no partisan feelings, nor the
slightest wish to make ourselves consistent with the creed of either AntiSlavery party, and that our only aim is to know what is truth and what is
duty in respect to the matter in dispute, holding ourselves perfectly free to
change our opinion in any direction, and at any time which may be
indicated by our immediate apprehension of truth, unbiased by the smiles
or frowns of any class or party of abolitionists.xiii

Douglass here rhetorically occupied the position of the classical faithful interpreter,
whose interpretive practice is bound by reason, but who is left free to accept or reject the
ends of the document according to his own moral lights.
In 1851 Douglass announced the change in his position. In the first written
defense of his new position, Douglass emphasized, not the capacity of truth and reason to
illuminate politically contentious questions, but rather the interpretive “rights” of the
people:
I scout the idea that the question of the constitutionality, or
unconstitutionality of slavery, is not a question for the people. I hold that
every American citizen has a right to form an opinion of the constitution,
and to propagate that opinion, and to use all honorable means to make his
opinion the prevailing one. Without this right, the liberty of an American
citizen would be as insecure as that of a Frenchman.xiv

Read literally, this passage attacks a confused target. Who among his interlocutors
believed that the people did not enjoy the right to form an opinion of the constitutionality
of slavery? Douglass himself had always apparently considered himself entitled to form
and advance such opinions. It is possible that Douglass meant to assert his right to differ
from those he admired so greatly, those Garrisonians who had been so vital to his
intellectual and political development.xv But in emphasizing the “right” to interpret the
Constitution, rather than the duty to interpret it according to truth and reason, Douglass
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could also have been signaling a change in his conception of the proper relationship
between citizen and Constitution.
Douglass then told the American Anti-Slavery Society that he had arrived at the
conviction that “the Constitution, construed in the light of well-established rules of legal
interpretation, might be made consistent in its details with the noble purposes in its
preamble.”xvi He insisted that the Constitution “be wielded in behalf of emancipation.”xvii
Far from deliberating over whether the Constitution’s ends could be his own, Douglass
now wished his audience to “wield” the Constitution-- like a tool? His language
emphasized not the revelation of constitutional meaning to the faithful interpreter, but
rather the interpreter’s active management of that meaning—the Constitution was not
“revealed” to be consistent with its own preamble, but rather would be “made” to be so.
(get ‘revealed’ pp #)
Douglass emphasized the political necessity of this switch, as well as its integrity.
In his editorial pages he emphasized that “[n]ever . . . will the North be roused to
intelligent and efficient action against slavery, until it shall become the settled conviction
of the people, that slavery is anarchical, unconstitutional, and wholly incapable of
legalization.”xviii He emphasized the significance of the Constitution for the winning the
sentiments of Northerners: “The people of the North are a law abiding people. They love
order and respect the means to that end . . . While men thus respect law, it becomes a
serious matter so to interpret the law as to make it operate against liberty.”(where is this
from??)
When radical abolitionists challenged his constitutional reading, Douglass
deflected their questions about the fugitive slave clause to the larger question of which
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interpretive strategy was most likely to abolish slavery, and to the responsibility of
citizens to adopt that strategy. Hence he chastised the radical abolitionists for their shortsightedness; they would give up “the firm basis of anti-slavery operation” that the Union
provides, while forsaking their responsibility to slaves.xix And he emphasized that “[t]he
slaveholder has the best of the argument the very moment the legality and
constitutionality of slavery is conceded,” for such a doctrine “drives conscientious
abolitionists from the ballot-box, reduces the masses—who would be practical
abolitionists into mere ‘Free Soilers,’ and arms the slaveholder with almost the only
available power this side of revolution to defeat the anti-slavery movement.”xx
When challenged by the Garrisonians as an inconsistent opportunist, Douglass
articulated his understanding of the role of a reform movement: to work from the inside
to bring the understanding of the vanguard position to the entire movement. He also
emphasized that his consistency was of a higher order than that of the Garrisonians:

Anti-Slavery consistency itself, in our view, requires of the Anti-Slavery
voter that disposition of his vote and his influence, which, in all the
circumstances and likelihoods of the case tend most to the triumph of Free
Principles in the Councils and Government of the nation. . . Right AntiSlavery Action is that which deals the severest deadliest blow upon
Slavery that can be given at that particular time. Such action is always
consistent, however different may be the forms through which it expresses
itself.xxi

Here Douglass justified his interpretive transformation by reference to the needs of
abolitionism. Interpretation itself, or what Douglass now called “influence,” had become
a political power that citizens had a responsibility to exercise on behalf of abolition.xxii
The post-transformation Douglass was willing to chastise Taney’s Dred Scott
decision for reaching the very conclusion that Douglass himself had defended with
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Garrison. Douglass’ rejection of the “hell-black judgment of the Supreme Court,”
however, did not engage the legal or constitutional status of Dred Scott, but instead
appealed to the inherent wrongfulness of slavery. Douglass argued that
[t]he Supreme Court of the United States is . . . very great, but the
Supreme Court of the Almighty is greater. Judge Taney . . . cannot change
the essential nature of things—making evil good, and good evil. Happily
for the whole human family, their rights have been defined, declared, and
decided in a Court higher than the Supreme Court.xxiii

In this speech, Douglass demonstrated impatience with legal reasoning, and nowhere
challenged the Supreme Court on interpretive questions of the Constitution but instead
focused his critique squarely on the morality of the decision itself. Some scholars have
called this a natural law approach to constitutional interpretation.xxiv Indeed, Douglass’
response to the decision emphasized that whether or not “the intention of the law-giver is
the law” in fact “depends on whether the intention itself is lawful,” and that “laws against
fundamental morality are void.” xxv But natural law makes recourse to a higher standard
than the Constitution. By failing to relate the commitments of natural law reasoning to
the obligations of legal fidelity, Douglass stepped outside of the position of the classical
faithful interpreter.
Contrast his approach to Dred Scott with that of Lincoln. Lincoln, also sometimes
claimed as a natural lawyer, was careful to contextualize his disagreement with Dred
Scott within a broader constitutional theory that laid out the possibility that he would
have to comply with a decision he believed to be strikingly immoral. Lincoln emphasized
his compliance with the particular holding of the case as it applied to Dred Scott himself;
Lincoln emphasized the distinction between disagreement and outright resistance; and,
invoking a constitutional theory that is sensible from within the terms of a classically
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faithful practice, Lincoln specifically identified the context that could force him to
comply with the decision as authoritative precedent:

If this important decision had been made by the unanimous concurrence of
the judges, and without any apparent partisan bias, and in accordance with
legal public expectation, and with the steady practice of the departments
throughout our history, and had been in no part, based on assumed
historical facts which are not really true; or, if wanting in some of these, it
had been before the court more than once, and had there been affirmed and
re-affirmed through a course of years, it then might be, perhaps would be,
factious, nay, even revolutionary, to not acquiesce in it as a precedent.xxvi

Although both men rejected the principle of the decision, Lincoln emphasized his
positioning as a faithful interpreter by carefully spelling out the formal conditions that
could mandate his compliance. Douglass’ response offered no such possibility, and
instead unapologetically challenged the opinion from the perspective of a political
reformer. Dred Scott may be wrong as a matter of constitutional interpretation—Taney
certainly took great latitude in constructing the framers’ original intent, as well as in his
reading of citizenship and membership at the time of the Constitution’s ratification. But
Taney’s faulty reasoning does not mean that Douglass’ response to it, or the larger
interpretive theory behind Douglass’ response, was constitutionally correct according to
the classical model of fidelity. Douglass did not only change positions on the basis of a
strategic judgment; rather, his new position itself was essentially a strategic position, one
that called upon the people, the President, and the Supreme Court to interpret the
document as a tool for achieving abolition.
I wish to emphasize the depth of this strategic element in order to distinguish
Douglass’ post-1951 interpretive position from other interpretive theories that contain a
significant role for moral evaluation. For example, although Robert Bork and Frederick
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Schauer both emphasize the role of law in displacing the independent moral judgments of
interpreters, Ronald Dworkin explicitly links a faithful constitutional practice to moral
engagement with the Constitution’s aspirations. One understanding of Douglass’
transformation could be that he simply switched from the originalism of Bork to the
aspirational liberal egalitarianism of Dworkin—perhaps for strategic reasons, but still
articulating a constitutional position that is not itself essentially strategic.
But what is Dworkin’s interpretive position? Dworkin, like Douglass, commits
himself to the view that constitutional ambiguities— legal ambiguities—should be filled
out according to the best available political morality. Constitutional fidelity means, for
Dworkin, a commitment to read the Constitution in its best light. But Dworkin maintains
his position as a classical faithful interpreter in two ways, both of which Douglass would
reject. Dworkin distinguishes his account from a purely strategic one first through the
concept of ‘fit.’ ‘Fit’ requires that the interpreters’ judgment be tested according to
whether it can find a place within the past practices of the nation. If it cannot, the
interpretation must be discarded as a constitutional interpretation no matter how
otherwise attractive it may be. Second, Dworkin develops a distinction between concepts
and conceptions.xxvii The ‘concepts’ that the Constitution engages are held to be
inviolable, whereas Dworkin argues that the particular meanings of those concepts should
be worked out by reference to a good political philosophy. It matters that ‘natural born’
for the President refers to citizenship and not to whether the birth is vaginal or Caesarean.
But once we know that ‘natural born’ refers to citizenship and not the birth process, it is
not relevant, for Dworkin, to know how the framers constructed the meaning of
citizenship, or the conditions under which they believed it was appropriate to award birth
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citizenship. (It is for this reason that Dworkin is driven to reject the privacy argument in
Roe v. Wade. (get cite) The Constitution never invokes the concept of privacy, and so a
faithful practice cannot reference that concept either.) Hence, for Dworkin, fidelity means
invoking only the concepts given to us by the public meaning of the text, whereas our
particular conceptions are subject to legitimate moral dispute and revision.
Frederick Douglass would reject both of these constraints. He almost certainly
would reject conceptualizing ‘fit’ according to a nation’s past practices, since a core
element of his transformation involved chastening the authority that past practice can
claim.xxviii He would also reject the idea that constitutional authority rests in the public
meaning of the Constitution’s concepts. In practice, he was indeed willing to interpret
ambiguous clauses in a liberty-promoting direction (for example, he argued that the
power to put down insurrections could empower the government not only to repress slave
insurrections, but also to abolish slavery itself where its practice was a source of
insurrection; he also argued that the prohibition on bills of attainder could serve to
abolish slavery.)xxix But Douglass was also willing to interpret clauses that indicate clear
support for slavery out of their clear meanings.
The most important example is his interpretation of the fugitive slave clause.xxx
Douglass’ interpretation of this clause is the lynchpin of my argument that his approach
was strategic and instrumental in a way that classical theories of constitutional fidelity
cannot countenance. Let us examine the language of the fugitive slave clause:

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation
therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered
up on Claim of the Party to whom Service or Labour may be due.xxxi
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The clause does not use the term “slave.” It instead marks out a class of people who are
held to labor under the positive laws of a state, and mandates that this class of people
cannot be legally discharged from that labor by “escaping” into another state. After 1851,
Douglass argued that the language of the clause could not cover slaves, since slaves’
incapacity to enter into contracts meant that “service or labor” could not be “due” from
them. And it is true that, according to classic tenants of natural law, labor cannot be
“due” from slaves. Douglass furthermore argued that the language instead referred to
indentured servants, who could make contracts.
This interpretation contains a fatal mistake. To be plausible, Douglass’
interpretation requires ignoring that the relevant clause explicitly qualifies the labor
“due” from this class of people with the phrase “under the laws thereof.” That language
explicitly marks the distinction between positive and natural law and indicates that a
positive law reading is appropriate in this case. The clause does not specify that there is a
class of people from whom labor is due, but rather that there are people from whom labor
is due “under the laws” of one state. Douglass could hardly deny that state laws
obligating slaves to their masters in fact existed. Furthermore, the fact that the clause
could include servants does not mean that it excludes slaves. If slaves are covered under
the category of people from whom “labor may be due” under the laws of the state, then
they are covered whether or not servants are also covered. Douglass himself had, prior to
his transformation, called it an “absurdity” to exclude slaves from general language that
one might have thought relevant to them (for example, the 3/5 clause’s invocation of “all
other persons”).xxxii
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In addition to his misrepresentation of the meaning of the fugitive slave clause,
after 1851, Douglass also constructed the 3/5 clause as a disability to slavery because
slave states were not able to count their full slave population for the purposes of political
representation.xxxiii (give exact quotation) But slaves could not vote. Any votes they were
apportioned benefited only their oppressors. The true disability to the South – which also
would have been an accurate representation of the political status of slaves-- would have
been to count slaves as zero. Even worse, the benefit conferred on the South by the 3/5
clause was of serious political consequence. The bolstering of representation of the South
in the House of Representatives and Electoral College was pivotal for the passage or
defeat of several pieces of key antebellum slavery legislation.xxxiv Given that slaves could
not vote, any votes they were apportioned would benefit their oppressors, and
slaveholders claimed slaves not as humans but as property, Douglass’ interpretation of
this generous apportionment as a slavery disability – a disability which would have been
evened had slaves been counted as a full persons– makes no sense at all.
One scholar has characterized these efforts as a form of “naïve textual formalism”
meant to resist the “racial cryptography” of the Constitution.xxxv But Douglass’
hyperliteralism was far from naïve. Douglass was a self-aware interpreter: “[i]n all
matters where laws are taught to be made the means of oppression, cruelty, and
wickedness, I am for strict construction. I will concede nothing. It must be shown that it
is so nominated in the bond. The pound of flesh, but not one drop of blood.”xxxvi Claiming
the position of Portia in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice, Douglass criticized Lincoln’s
Inaugural address: “He will have the pound of flesh, blood or no blood, be it more or less,
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a just pound or not. The Shylocks of the South, had they been after such game, might
have exclaimed, in joy, and Abraham come to judgment!”xxxvii
Douglass’ hyperliteralism was a deeply intelligent strategy of resistance to the
insinuations of racial domination. But this hyperliteralism also loses touch with public
conceptions of meaning so completely that it actually loses contact with the idea of legal
fidelity at all. Portia’s strategy in the Merchant of Venice is a legalistic subversion; it is a
way of defeating a contract from within. Douglass himself never articulated whether his
encounter with the words of the Constitution was subject to any interpretive discipline
other than morality itself, or what those disciplining practices would be.
Douglass’ post-1851 position does not show concern for the issue of legal fidelity.
His failure to address the distinction between legal and natural obligation (a theme that
had greatly interested him before); his willingness to speak of the Constitution as a tool to
be used for moral purposes; his emphatic arguments about the strategic value of
constructing the Constitution in an abolitionist direction; his engagement with
constitutional questions like Dred Scott in terms, not of constitutional fidelity, but of the
direct wrongfulness of slavery; his willingness to misinterpret the content of the Fugitive
Slave clause, and to mangle the significance of the 3/5 clause-- all of these make it
appropriate to label Douglass’ new position self-consciously strategic. Douglass was
strategic on behalf of a moral end, and he justified his strategy in terms of what was
needed to respond to an overwhelming evil of his time. But strategic constitutional
interpretation is distinctive precisely because it undermines the possibility of principled
rejection, the rejection of Garrison and Wendell Phillips, and hence, the classical theory
claims, the possibility of principled consent.
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Consent, Rejection, Fidelity
It is appropriate here to say more on what is at stake in this question of fidelity.
The notion of interpretive fidelity is intimately bound to consent, and consent theory
probably offers the single most fruitful avenue for thinking about justified coercion that
political science has been able to muster. Consent lies at the heart of any classical theory
of constitutional authority. The idea that individuals should not be bound to obey except
under terms to which they have agreed is expressed in the American founding tradition
through the Federalist aspiration to create a constitutional order by “reflection and
choice.”xxxviii
But consent theory requires us to countenance the possibility that citizens might
reject the Constitution’s commitments, and hence the Constitution itself. There is a link
between consent and the possibility of rejection. Consent can only generate political
authority if it happens in a context where rejection is a real possibility.xxxix Hence Sotirios
Barber insists that “genuine reaffirmation is possible only for those who are prepared to
reject the Constitution.”xl The development of the idea of “manufactured consent,” a
phase coined by Walter Lippman and spun off by Noam Chomsky, is disturbing precisely
because it threatens the idea that citizen’s consent would be freely given, self-created,
and hence authoritative.xli For consent to be “manufactured” means that it is not freely
given, could not be withdrawn, and hence ceases to be politically authoritative.
The link between authoritative consent and the possibility of rejection is not only
a theorist’s concern. Jefferson’s appeal for periodic revolutions was directly connected to
the idea that the Constitution can have no real authority if its rejection or replacement is
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not a real possibility for living generations. Virginia and New York explicitly linked their
ratification of the Constitution to the people’s continued right to withdraw should the
Constitution’s government prove unworthy of consent.xlii It was precisely because of the
centrality of principled consent for the general project of self-government that radical
abolitionists chose to reject the Constitution’s authority, and the logic of their principled
stance was accepted even by their opponents. For example, Lysander Spooner, a political
abolitionist, agreed that “[i]f abolitionists think that the constitution supports slavery,
they ought not to ask for power under it . . . [r]evolution should be their principle.”xliii
Everyone in this game recognized that principled interpretation meant that a great deal
was at stake in one’s reading of the Constitution; a principled interpreter who arrived at a
pro-slavery reading of the Constitution could be put in a position where morality and
fidelity conflicted, and hence could be obliged by the demands of fidelity to reject the
Constitution’s authority wholesale.
Even admitting that consent, to be genuinely authoritative, may require the
possibility of rejection, what does this mean for the question of fidelity? Although
consent happens from “outside” of a constitutional order and interpretation happens from
“within”, the concept of fidelity works within the conceptual framework of most theories
of constitutional interpretation to preserve the authority of the consenting or ratifying
moment. More precisely, because interpretive theories must maintain the possibility of
principled rejection as a condition for maintaining constitutional authority, justifying any
particular interpretive method always involves demonstrating, at some point, that that
interpretive theory allows for the possibility of constitutional rejection. For this reason,
Barber writes that the effort to “find interpretations of the Constitution that make it
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workable in all circumstances” only leads interpreters to “inadvertently reject the
Constitution’s authority.”xliv To preserve the meaning of consent, the constitutionally
faithful are asked to be self-disciplined in their interpretive practice: “[r]especting the
Constitution, they respect constitutionality—which is to say, the distinction between what
is politically desired and constitutionally permitted.”xlv An instrumental attitude towards
the Constitution carries the danger of blurring this distinction: hence, according to
Barber, a truly constitutional citizen, one who accepts the Constitution’s claim to
supremacy, cannot accept the Constitution for mere instrumental reasons but must also
accept the Constitution’s ends as his or her own.xlvi Hadley Arkes, too, mocks the
instrumentalism of the constitutional “philistine”:

[When asked about the federal government’s authority over discrimination
in housing,] [m]y interlocutor reflected on the question for a while—a
short while, as I recall—and he conceded that the question did indeed pose
an interesting ‘academic’ problem. But he went on courteously to remind
me that he was, after all, in the business of litigating cases. As with many
other lawyers, he would fill his brief with references to any part of the
Constitution that could offer even a slender connection . . . It was not his
business to divine just which one of these clauses or slogans would touch
the credulity of the judges and produce the result he was seeking from the
court.xlvii

Justice Antonin Scalia references this classical ideal when he writes of the possible
tensions that could arise between his Catholicism and his oath to the Constitution as a
jurist.xlviii If Catholocism were stringently anti-death penalty, Scalia believes he would be
obligated to use the powers of his office to defeat the death penalty, although as a
principled interpreter he does not believe an anti-death-penalty reading to be faithful to
the Constitution’s text. Because the instrumental use of constitutional interpretation to
advance Catholic aims would be for him an act of bad faith, Scalia believes he would be
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obligated to resign in this case. (Luckily for him, he does not believe Catholocism to
mandate resistance to the death penalty). Barber, Scalia, Bork, Arkes, Rehnquist,
Dworkin, Ely – every serious constitutional theorist agrees that constitutional practice is
about “reaffirming ideas and provisions thought to have been recognized or established
by those who framed and ratified the Constitution and its amendments,” not about
“altering constitutional norms to conform to changing political demands.”xlix Every
serious interpretive theory squares itself with the possibility of rejection, and tries to
show that its methodology can lead the interpreter to judgments about obligations of the
constitutional text that deviate from what the interpreter’s own political morality would
require.
Now, of course, fidelity cannot mean that we never choose interpretive theories
with an eye towards the results they are likely to generate. Desired results often play
some part in choosing which interpretive theory one adopts. For example, no interpretive
theory of the US Constitution today can be a plausible candidate unless it generates the
conclusion that the Brown v. Board of Education decision went the right way. For some
interpreters, any theory that cannot justify a women’s constitutional right to an abortion,
or an employer’s right to freedom of contract, is suspect for that reason. But this concern
for results occurs within limits. No interpreter expects to be able to achieve all of their
most desired outcomes through constitutional reasoning; and no interpreter operating
under classical notions of fidelity can be comfortable simply ignoring the textual
guarantees of the Constitution, as Douglass did.

Misinterpreting Douglass
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It should not be surprising, then, that so many scholars have misinterpreted this
instrumentalist element of Douglass’ thought. Frederick Douglass is a hero of the
Constitution’s development, and it seems ungrateful to label him a subversive. Hence his
position is continuously misrepresented. David Schrader and Charles Mills have each
explored his transformation from the perspective of natural law versus positivism; the
varieties of originalism; or the merits of originalism versus textualism; but their extensive
readings of his positions nowhere reveal how subversive the strategic element of
Douglass’ post-transformation position really is from the point of view of a consentminded theorist.l
Douglass is frequently presented as a “textualist”: in Robert Bernasconi’s
discussion of Douglass’ position on the fugitive slave clause, Douglass is presented as
someone attached to the “plain meaning” of the Constitution’s text. But Douglass’
interpretive position is not positivist or textualist, because he was in fact willing to
explicitly ignore the plain meaning of the text in his reading of that clause. Aileen
Kraditor accepts the argument Douglass offered about the fugitive slave clause as an
exercise in natural law reasoning, and she characterizes Spooner and Douglass’ approach
as resting upon an “extreme emphasis on theoretical principles.”li But Spooner and
Douglass’ reading can only be understood as a “natural law” reading according to the
revolutionary strand of natural law theory. As we have seen, because Douglass did not
relate the obligations of natural law to the demands of textual fidelity, his position cannot
be understood as a natural law interpretive position.lii The “theoretical principles” that the
position relies upon, then, are not principles of interpretive fidelity.
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Another effort involves arguing that Douglass is a faithful interpreter because he
is willing to construct constitutional vagueness in favor of liberty. Bernasconi, for
example, takes at face value Douglass’s assertion that, according to the “well known
rules of legal interpretation,” the language of law must be construed “strictly in favor of
liberty and justice.”liii But this is simply Douglass’ misrepresentation of his own practice.
The “well known rule of legal interpretation” that counsels such interpretation is for use
in matters where the text is vague. And the fugitive persons clause is not vague.
Even the legal historian Jack Balkin, probably the most sensitive interpreter of
Douglass’ position from the point of view of legal fidelity, elides the depth of this
subversive element of Douglass’ thought. Balkin is the scholar who has come closest to
recognizing what is at stake in Douglass’ position, but his excavation of Douglass’
thought is only suggestive and ultimately collapses Douglass’ position back into what is,
for most normative constitutional theorists, a domain of defensible interpretive strategies.
Balkin writes that Douglass read the Constitution “literally,” but he puts the word in
quotes without indicating how exactly he means to qualify that term.liv Balkin also
suggests that “one wants to dismiss [Douglass’ fugitive slave clause argument] legally as
off the wall,” but it turns out that Balkin’s reason for dismissing it is that Douglass’
interpretation ran counter to so much of what American lawyers at the time believed.lv
Many plausible constitutional interpretations run counter to what contemporary lawyers
believe; what is important about Douglass’ position is that it runs counter to the explicit
text. Balkin does label Douglass as “the most extreme example of [the] tendency” to
“remedy the positive law of the Constitution of its existing defects” through the project of
“ideal constitutionalism,”lvi and he also calls Douglass’ position an “overextension” of a
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“charitable” interpretive attitude.lvii But the impact of this critique is again evaded when
we discover that for Balkin, “ideal constitutionalism” only means the effort to deal with
ambiguity by “conforming the object of our interpretation to our sense of what is just,” a
project which should be criticized because it would “separate the true Constitution or the
best interpretation of the Constitution from its various historical interpretations.” (Balkin
suggests here that the true Constitution cannot be separated from its various historical
interpretations, a position which undercuts the major premise of normative constitutional
theory, namely that even broadly-shared interpretations can be legally indefensible.)
According to Balkin, then, Douglass is misguided because he was willing to stretch the
Constitution’s meaning so far away from what his contemporaries believed it to mean.
This, again, misses the more serious problem.
Balkin speaks of Douglass as a constitutional “redeemer,” as I will do later in this
article; but when he writes of “redemption,” Balkin does not mean to countenance the
possibility that interpreters would purposefully misconstrue the Constitution’s meaning.
In his article on constitutional redemption, Balkin asks us to “commit ourselves to the
constitutional project” with an understanding that this project “contains the resources for
its own redemption,”lviii and he writes that “one reason why our Constitution is
redeemable is that parts of it were designed to be redeemable—it contains language that
can be adapted to changing times and circumstances and it contains moral and political
principles that demand the continual improvement of our institutions.”lix But he makes it
clear that “adapting” this language does not include misconstruing its public meaning-for example, he argues that, redemption project notwithstanding, Article IV section 4’s
guarantee that the states will be protected from “domestic violence” cannot refer to

24

assault within a home, nor can that section’s guarantee of a “Republican” government to
the states be read as a guarantee that state governments will be controlled by members of
the Republican party.lx For Balkin, then, redeemability does not mean jettisoning
classical notions of interpretive fidelity. It means working within a classically faithful
interpretive practice to achieve justice using the Constitution’s text, values, and
institutions: he in fact links redemption and classical fidelity when he writes that
“interpretive fidelity requires faith in the redeemability of the Constitution over time.”lxi
Hence, although Balkin intriguingly gestures towards concepts that are critical for
understanding Douglass’ thought, he ultimately does not present the contours of the
serious problem Douglass poses for the classical conception of constitutional fidelity.
There is one more possibility for arguing that Douglass’ position is faithful. This
would involve arguing that Douglass’ position is plausible because it is congruent with
the spirit of the Constitution as manifest in its Preamble and in the Declaration. Just as
Lincoln suggested that we read the Constitution as the “picture of silver” framing the
“apple of gold” found in the Declaration of Independence, perhaps Douglass’ efforts are
consistent with a faithful interpretive practice that understands the true meaning of the
Constitution to reside in its aspirations towards liberty.lxii But ultimately this effort, too,
must fail. Lincoln offered these suggestions as a way of responding to interpretive
ambiguity; under classical notions of fidelity, it is not a faithful interpretive practice to
argue that because (1) the Preamble directs the establishment of “prosperity,” and (2)
“prosperity” would include the equal distribution of property, that (3) we should ignore
away any explicit Constitutional guarantees of property rights or guarantees against
uncompensated takings. Nor can the Declaration’s aspiration towards “equality” – or the
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14th Amendment, for that matter-- mean that the federal government is constitutionally
justified in abolishing the Senate on the grounds that that institution violates the principle
of equal representation. To select certain parts of the Constitution to ignore on behalf of
other parts is not fidelity. In the words of Jack Balkin, “being a little bit unfaithful is like
being a little bit pregnant. If one is to exercise the virtue of constitutional fidelity, it must
be to the entire document, not just a part.”lxiii

Redeeming Douglass
According to dominant accounts of constitutional fidelity, the argument presented
here should mean that Douglass was a faithless interpreter—a justified revolutionary,
perhaps, or a savvy reformer, but not a faithful constitutional citizen. But Douglass’
considerable moral and political authority should lead us to scrutinize carefully whether
this conclusion is warranted. For many citizens, the route to constitutional affiliation lies
precisely through an identification with Douglass. The Constitution is redeemed for them
through an appreciation of what it was used to achieve.lxiv Sanford Levinson explicitly
connects his personal Constitutional ratification with Douglass’ efforts, writing that “I
was convinced by Douglass . . that the Constitution offers us a language by which we can
protect those rights that we deem to be important. . . So I was willing in effect to honor
the memory of Douglas and the potential that was—and is—available in our Constitution,
and I added my signature to the scroll endorsing the 1787 Constitution.”lxv But why
should we honor Douglass’ memory by ratifying a document that Douglass himself was
driven to subversively misconstrue? Are citizens like Levinson who affiliate to the
Constitution through Douglass deeply confused? Or is there anything plausible in their
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attitude? A true redemption of Douglass as a faithful constitutional citizen—one that
takes seriously the challenge he poses-- may lie through a reworked understanding of the
relationship between consent theory and constitutional practice.
I would like to offer a few considerations that might allow us to redeem a
constitutional position like that of Douglass’. If there is a way to claim Douglass as a
faithful interpreter, the route goes through an understanding of the distinctiveness of the
political office he was exercising. Frederick Douglass was not a judge or official
interpreter. After his freedom was purchased, he became a free man and then a citizen of
New York.
Behind all interpretive accounts of the Constitution lies an implicit understanding
of who is doing the interpreting. Most interpretive theories are addressed to judges, and
the substance that they offer reflects this distinctive positioning of the interpreter. For
example, the major works of constitutional interpretation by Dworkin, Ely, Bork, Posner,
Tribe, and so forth are almost entirely preoccupied by questions that judges face. These
theories devote a great deal of energy to making sure that the mistakes judges may make
do not bear unfavorably on the democratic process. They are heavily informed by the
distinctive institutional positioning of the judiciary. For example, if they were offering
interpretive theories for legislatures, the content of their theories would presumably be
less affected by a concern for the countermajoritarian difficulty.
But the office of “citizen” is distinctive from the office of judge, and consent
theory tells us why. The office of citizen is privileged in consent theory. Although this
office is constitutionally codified (the Constitution specifies and constructs the political
identity of the “voter”, for example), the position of that office is distinctive because the
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authority of the document as a whole is believed to rest on its public ratification. Judges
and legislators owe their political and legal authority to the Constitution under which they
serve. Furthermore, they have a representational responsibility which circumscribes the
interpretive space that might otherwise be available to them. But citizens do not owe their
political authority to the document and citizens are not charged with representing others.
It is the Constitution that owes its authority to the consent of the people. The people’s
political freedom regarding whether or not to consent is absolute. Perhaps under certain
conditions they face a similar freedom in the question of how they might consent.
This relationship might make it more justifiable for citizens to engage in
politically-motivated and deeply strategic relationships to the text that they have not
chosen. Perhaps a faithful constitutional practice is precisely one that allows for a flawed
constitutional order to be redeemed, that makes the document consent-worthy even as we
understand that actual legal consent is almost never legally relevant to the lives of actual
citizens or to the life of the polity. In that case, the moral appeal of the vision itself—and
the moral appeal of the institutional relationships that vision implies—might properly be
the primary interpretive constraint that citizens and moral reformers face.
The ongoing success of the constitutional project cannot be separated from the moral
relationships that that constitutional order manages to sustain. If constitutional success is
evaluated according to a constitution’s ongoing contribution to the effort for political
justice, then a constitutional practice in which citizens understand themselves as
relatively unfettered from the interpretive positions of past generations might allow for a
more successful constitutional practice than one in which dead-hand concerns weighed
heavily on all interpreters all the time. Under this possible conception of fidelity, judges,
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legislators, and presidents would owe deference to the public understandings of the text
when ratified and when amended (as spelled out in the classical conception of fidelity),
but the primary deference of citizens would be to the moral appeal of the interpretive
position itself. The work of citizens would be not to represent the positions of others but
rather to generate public conceptions of the document that are more praiseworthy, from a
justice point of view, than the conceptions that they received.
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